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Abstract
In this paper a characterization of economic goods and economic allocation
organizations is proposed that enables an analysis of the interdependence be-
twcen the two types of organizations that together provide the commodity, viz.
the production organization and the allocation organization. The characteriza-
tions are based on the distinction made tor goods as well as for organizations
between their domain of valuations, i.e., the desired attributes, and their domain
of resources, i.e., the carriers of these attributes. It generalizes the concept of
an economic good by introducing social interaction in valuations. Since an allo-
cation organization determines the conditions for a production organization, it
also influence the behavioral rules and the production processes of organizations
according to deductive conditioning theories. On the other hand, many actions
and commodities are results of processes that don't fit in existing allocation
organizations and stimulate the emergence of new allocation organízations.
1 Introduction
It is commonly understood that economic organizations may not fully meet the de-
signer's expectations about their performance, because an improvement would require
more effort and resources than the marginal benefits are worth. This type of imperfec-
tion is inherent to the realization of any ewnomic project and foreseen by any rational
designcr. A more fundamcntal problem seems to be that an organization interacts with
its environment which causes endogenous changes in the environment that unfit the
organization for its task. When we try to analyse this question, we have to choose char-
acteristics of both the organization and the environment that make sucó a comparison
p09SIbIC.
We address this question specifically regarding economic production and allo-
cation organizations. In that case the environment in which such an organization
functions can be characterized by the type of economic goods being produced and
allocated. Interaction between the allocation organization and its environment are
thus understood through the development of that organization as well as the economic
goods allocated through that organization. For example, when the first automobiles2
used gasoline, both cars and gasoline were supplied by private producers and both mar-
ket.s wcrc pcrforming satisfactorily to allocate demand and supply. `I'he tremendous
groH l.h uf nrohilit.y liati rnadc production vcry complcx, Icading Lo an oligopolistir rnar-
kct :rs allocalion urganiiat.ion, has stimulat.ed mass conswnption causing widreprcad
externalit,ies, such as environrnental damage by Lhe ernission of carbon dioxides, and
has caused a trade off be,tween congestion and road infrastructure. None of these goods
are handled satisfactorily by the original market mechanism. Therefore improved and
more complex allocation mechanisms have to be - and are - designed and imple-
mented in order to meet these new challenges.
For the analysis of this problem, the interaction between an allocation organiza-
tion and an economic commodity, the explicit recognition of the institutional compo-
nent of allocation mechanisms is required. In order to do so, we will make a distinction
- both for economic goods and allocation organizations - between the domain of valu-
ations expressed by actors in the economy, and the domain of resources needed for the
provision of economic goods and controlled by decision makers called below owners (of
produrtive resources) and governors (of allocative resources). An economic commodity
is then viewed as a physical carrier of desired attributes, and an allocation organization
as an institute carrying an allocation mechanism. This property allows us to describe
both the economic goods and the allocation organizations by a comparable system of
characteristics.
When we don't take the transaction costs into account that are needed for trad-
ing private goods, we exclude the domain of resources from the allocation. In that
case there may exist for some specific economic commodity a perfect match between
its valuation attributes and a specific allocation mechanism, an allocation mechanism
belonging by definition to the domain of valuation. Consider, e.g., private goods and
the market mechanism. This implies that the environment in which an allocation orga-
nization functions may partly be characterized by the valuation attributes of suitable
economic commodities. When we add the domain of resources to our analysis, the
environment of an allocation organization can fully be characterized by the charac-
teristics of economic commodities. R.estricting our attention to the valuation domain,
the environment of a market or price mechanism are private goods, while the environ-3
ment. of centrally managed - or governmental - allocation mechanisms are collective
commodities.~
(`.hangc~s in the organization as well a.5 changes in the propertiew of the cornmodi-
Iirw alluratod lcad to inc~ompatibility problems and disrupt,urc of t.hc socio-n:onornic
franicwork.l When allocative resources are spent on a rnarkeL rnechanisrn, such as
in the case of transaction costs, agents react to the unfitness of the market by either
changing the allocation organization or the properties of the commodities involved.
Thc first type of reaction refers to the Coasian foundation of the firm (Coase (1937)).
The second type of reaction is observed in financial markets, in which new financial
instruments are deaigned to encounter transaction costs. Hence, we make plausible
that, when we also take the domain of resources into account, such an imperfect match
incites agents to change the character of the commodity and the organiaation by real-
location of their respective resources. The fundamental reason seems to be that both
resources and valuations are considered as forces that move human activity. The re-
sulting changes either destabilize the allocation organization for the new commodity,
or destabilize the commodity in the new allocation organization.
In order to characterize allocation organizations and economic goods we use
resourc,es and valuations as analytical domains. These will be defined in the next two
sections. We can refer to the classical distinction between form and content.3 We
will disentangle these two aspects firstly for a commodity and next for an alloca.tion
organization.
rThe internal organization of firma may be considered as an internal allocation organization con-
trolling amaller production unita some of which have collective propertiea for the firm.
~See also Knight (1992) and Simon (1991) for an account of economic inatitutiona in changing
social circumstances. The theory as forwarded by Knight (1992), however, differs substantially from
the clasaification as propoeed in this paper. FLrthermore, we point out that our line of reasoning
more cloaely followa Simon (1991), who emphasizes that economica ahould provide a proper frame-
work in which we can develop insighta in the organization of economic decisiona taking into account
imperfectiona of these organizations aa well as the commodities allocated through theae organizations.
~Lancaster's (196G) consurnption technology has been baved on a eimilar separation. Our approach,
howrver, is based on the method of context reconstruction presented in Ruys (1992). In both cases
comrnodities are conaidered as carriere of desirable ptoperties. The main difference is that according to
the aecond approach a reconstruction of the allocation problem requirea rulea for interaction between
resources and valuationa. This impliea a.o., that not only the product carriera are to be included in
thr. resourcea, hut also the allocation carriers.4
2 Characterization of economic goods
Economic goods are commodities that have a specific form, called the carrier, and
a spa~ific contenL, called the attributes. The carrier of a commodity is the physical
entil.y Lhat cau be produced, traded, provided, and used, e.g., orange juice, a compact
disk, or a municipal sewerage system. These characteristics require specific legal and
technical properties oí the carrier for its provision, such as identifiability, measurability,
marketability, and excludability from use by unauthorized users. Those properties
of the carrier are determined by its producer, i.e., the person or the organization
controlling the productive resources needed to provide the carrier endowed with the
desired attributes. Tlre control of resources usually implies ownership. However, one
of the public resources is the possibility to overrule the control of private resources by
an owner. Since the producer is assumed to anticipate fully on the future owner who
will re.imburse the resources spent, we may identify in this context the producer with
the futurc owner and call them the owner. Resources are the means of production
that are available in the chosen context, but also the means to control and implement
these economic forces in society, such as wealth, the capability to persuade or use force
in the society, and the rules accepted in society to allocate the means of production.
Resources represent the means needed to provide a specific carrier of a commodity
in that society in a wide sense, i.e., no distinction is made between resources spent
on allocation and resources spent on production. Although ownership rnay not be a
necessary condition for the control over these means, we will assume that the owner
is also the controller. The set of resources spent on production is called productive
resources. We classify these productive resources as follows:
Private resources: These are productive resources that enable an owner to produce
a carrier (such as orange juice) by means of voluntary transactions with other
owcrers;
Network resources: These are productive resources that enable an owner to produce
a carrier (such a.g an industrial standard agreed upon by the industry) by means
of voluntary submission by a set of owners of resources to a hierarchical network;5
Public resources: These are productive resources that enable an owner, e.g., a public
authority, to produce a carrier (such as a municipal sewerage installed on private
property) by means of involuntary submission to the public hierarchy, possibly
with additional voluntary transactions.
'I'hc~ productive resources are Lhus cla.gsificxl according Lo the degree of force Lhat czn be
usi~d by thc produccr, or the dcgree of freedom for individual owners o( products to usc
Lheir own resources. 4 Although the owner of a product determines who is admitted to
the use of the carrier, we claim that products made from public resources are available
to the public (possibly with an extra charge on the basis of voluntary exchange),
and products made from network resources are provided to a network. Given the
classification of productive resources above, this claim is based on the assumption that
producers are not allowed by the public to use more restrictive resources than necessary.
It follows that the classification also represents the degree of admission to the use of a
carrier of a commodity. So the term resources refers in this paper both to the degree
of freedorn owners have to provide carriers, and to the degree of admission users have
to access carriers of goods.
The content of a commodity are its attributes for which it is desired or detested.
These atttibutes are consumed by the access to a ca.rrier of a commodity and benefit
(positively or negatively) persons or organizations. A person or organization who
benefits from the access to (a carrier of) a commodity is called an actor. An actor can
be the user of a carrier as well as a third party.
Actors may benefit the use of a commodity independently of other actors. This
is the standard case in economic theory. This case is the basis of the individual ac-
countability of costs and benefits to one and the same actor. A more complex case
arises when the use of a commodity by one actor enters also in the utility or produc-
tion function of other actors, but these effects can be allotted to the individual actors
because they don't combine. This is the case of external effects. The new type of
interaction introduced here is the case in which the use of a commodity by two or more
~In line with Coase's transaction coats approach to the firm we make a diatinction between com-
pletely specífied private transactions and leee specified network transactions. Paying taxes and com-
pulsory military aervice typically belong to the last category.6
actors generates a beneficial or harmful effect that cannot be alloted to the individual
actors. When the utility function is more than an ordinal indicator and also expresses
the effect of consumption on an actor's capabilities, socia! intemction in the use of
commodities between actors is expressed by the fact that the use of a commodity by
one actor enters in the utility function of another actor and vice versa, i.e., u'(x, u~(x)),
for i,j- a, 6. Consider the difference between a meal for the need of food, and a social
dinner for two. More important examples are the use of a language and other cultural
expressions intended for interaction between actors, commodities aimed at cooperation,
and commodities based on ethical motives or on reciprocal respect.s Social interaction
is usually considered íree and costless by economists because it is hard Lo measure, for
one reason. Moral and social values, however, are based on this concept and seem to
be of growing importance, also for economists. For our organizational approach it is
important to distinguish the different conditions of commodities benefiting actors. We
classify these conditions as follows:
No interaetion: The access to a commodity only benefits the user-actor, and the
bene.fits to these actors do not interact;
External interaction: The access to a commodity by a user-actor also benefits or
harms another actor, but these benefits do not interact;
Social interaction: The access to a commodity benefits the user-actor only if this
benefit interacts with the benefits to other user-actors.
The term valuation refers in this paper to the degree of interaction of the benefits
to actors derived irom the access to an economic commodity. One may observe that
interaction between attributes of commodities can only be deterrnined when these
attributes refer to act.ual, not potential attributes. ror example, money or political
powc~r bclong to the dotnain uf resourecs, and not to thc dornain of valuat.ions!' Possiblc
inequities are caused by allocative defects, not by productive aspects. We further
SCompare Sen (1987).
óThis aleo explains why it is natural that there is no money in general equilibrium theory, i.e., the
theory of value.7
presume that interaction hampers the attribution of cost and benefits to actors and to
owners responsible for the provision. 'fhe degree of benefit attributability, fundamental
tor ironomic ef6ciency concepts, is expressed by the same classification. On the other
hand, interaction of benefits requires - to a certain extent - shared, and therefore
rather homogenous values, while independence of benefits allows for pluriform values.
In this sense the classification also refers to the degree of pluriformity among users of
a commodity.
Using this classification of the two domains, we can define or characaerize various
economic goods. Since our goal is to distinguish the resources spent for its provision
between production and allocation, this classification tries to capture the influence of
production resources. As has been mentioned above, this means that the criteria are
determined by the producer who is anticipating on the needs of the future owner and
user. We first give some examples in Table 1 of actual commodities for each category.
It may also be noticed that actually no commodity fits perfectly within the bounds of
a classification.
Valuation
!'roductíon social interaction external interaction no interaction
resources
public culture, police, a congested roads, road system, TV-
nativc language fire brigade entertainment
network education, family health care, toll roads, banking
culture, corporate environmental care services
culture
private newspapers, gifts, cigazettes, food, gasoline
exemplary some druga
performance
Table 1: Examples of vazious economic goods
Our discussion initially focuses on the last column, containing the case of non-inter-
active valuations - also called no rivalry in use, or purely individual benefits. Thiss
coincicles with Lhe neoclassical utilily concept where Lhe use o[ a conunodity only enters
into the user's utility or production function. A pure prívate commodity is defined
by a private carrier with non-interactive valuation. Examples are food and gasoline
having nc.gligeable externalities (it may be remarked that in reality there exists no
commodity that is completely free of externalities). The traditional polaz case to a
pure private commodity is the pure public commodity, defined by a public carrier and
non-interactive valuation. Examples are: TV-entertainment that one consumes alone
and ttiat one forgets after switchíng it off, and a noncongested road system.
The intermediate case between a pure public and a pure private commodíty is
that of a commodity, the carrier of which can only be used after entering a network.
Examples are public goods with excluaion, being made available at fixed prices up
to the total quantity produced, see Drèze (1980), and infra-public goods being public
goods that aze strong complements to specific private goods and made available by
paying a mark-up on these private goods, see Ruys (1993). Since public goods with
exclusion is a special case of infra-public goods, we call the third group infra-public
gooda. Gxamplcs arc toll roads and financial services.
In thc secoud column of 'l'able 1 commodities are mentioncd, Lhe access to which
causes externalities. These externalities may result from private access or uae, but may
also be purposely aimed at by a group of users. The latter class of commodities is called
cluó good.s by Cornes and Sandler (1986), although their definition also extends to what
we have called infra-public goods. When these gooda have effects for apecific groups of
people, even when admission to the cazrier is public, such as the natural environment,
congestion on roads, minimum wage labor or social security, we call them regulator
goods.
The first column refers to goods, which access or use generates benefits that
interact with benefits to othet actors. When auch goods have public resources, we
call them common goods. Examples are a native language, equity, the policing and
assessment uf deviant behavior, national defense, culture, and political systema. When
an actor needs to enter a network to acceas these commodities with interacting benefits,
we call t,hem clan goods. Examples are a nonnative language, education, a subculture,
a dinner, a party, or an enterprise culture. When goods with social interaction need9
only private resources, we call them shaned goods, such as a newspaper, or personal




social interaction external interaction no interaction
public common goods regulator goods pure public goods
network clan goods club goods infra-public goods
private ahared goods
i
externalities pure private ,goods
Table 2: Characterization of economic goods
We remark that the valuation of a commodity is better suited for economic acwunt-
ability and needs less consensus or ahared values as one goes in Table 2 to the right.
'I'l~c resource allows for more individual freedom, as one goes to the bottom. On the
other hand, goods with interacting benefits have cultural and ethical values that seem
indispe~nsable to motivate people. Also, some goods with public carriers are essential
to survive as an independent group or society.
3 Characterization of economic allocation organi-
zations
Next we consider the form and content of an economic allocation organization. This
approach again usea resources and valuations as analytical domaine, because we need
similar concepts to analyse the interaction between economic gooda and their allocation
organizations.
The carrier of an economic allocation organization is an institution, that has
specific characteristics to perform satisfactorily, auch as recognition, admisaion, and10
power of implementation (including reputation and trust). An institution aims at
redistributing or transferring rights to control economic goods.' These characteriatics
imply properties that constitute and identify the institution for persons or organizations
that. access and~or use the institution and are called owners. Those owners have been
mentioned above as determining the charactet of economic goods. The properties
of an institution are supported or determined by a- possibly fictitious - person or
organization called the governor. This governor controls the allocative resources needed
Lo pruvide thc carricr, such as cffort, rnoncy, and pavsibly thc, usc of forcc in thc socicty,
ou behalf o[ its owners. We classify these allocative resources according to the scopc
of the means needed to provide a apecific carrier of a commodity in that society.
Local resources: These are allocative resources spent on inatitutions (auch as gov-
c,nnnents) tl~aL can only be supplied to a governor on a local scalo. In particular
because a hierarchical organization using the exercise of force by the governor is
involved to which all owners belonging to the local community or network are
subjected;
Supra-local resources: These are allocative resources spent on institutions (such as
associations) that can be supplied to the governor by a network of owners who
voluntary submit some of their resources, poasibly including the exercise of force;
Global resources: These aze allocative resourcea apent on institutions (such as bar-
ter) that can be supplied voluntazy by the global network of ownera, notably
because the institution is self-enforcing, i.e., no exerciae of force by a governor is
needed to install the institution.
The allocative resources are thus classified according to the degree of freedom that
individual owners have to contribute their resources under the rules of an institution
'North (1981, p. 201) usea the term inatitution to emphasize the eocial sepect, in accordance
with the aociological definition of inatitution. He definee an inatitution "as a set of rulea, compliance
procedures, and moral and ethical behavioral norma deaigned to conatrain the behavior of individuals
in the intereata of maximizing the wealth or utilitiea of principale." In our approech theae rulea are
a.vaesaed by actora and belong to the domain of valuation, they are implemented by governora by
meana of allocative reeourcea. In this eenae an inetitution haa a goal of ite own.11
once they have entered this instítution.a We assume that the given specification of
allocative resources defines the domain of application for an economic allocation or-
ganization. Walrasian markets for private goods are typically making use of global
resources, since the owners themgelves are taking care of their proper functioning, ex-
plaining why typically the concept of Pareto efficiency can be used in a market economy
without minding abouL the cost of markets as allocation organizations. A government,
on the other hand, is both a production organization and an allocation organization.
'This explains the lack of effic.iency criteria for governmental actions and the drive to
privatization in order to introduce theae criteria.
The main element in the composition of an economic allocation organization
is the allceation mechanism itself, i.e., the game form or system of rules according to
which an allocation is determined. Since we want to compaze economic goods and
allocation organizations, we choose for both concepts the same classification in the
domain of valuation. An allocation mechanism is thus characterized by the types of
attributes of goods that it can allocate, which we call the pr,ocessed valuation of an
allocation organization by the actors. The flower auction in Aalameer, e.g., consists
of an allocation mechanism, the Dutch auction, and of an institution that takes care
of the performance of the auction. One of the conditions of good performance of the
institute is being well known. 9 The auction as mechaniam is characterized by the
processed valuation, in this case restricting the commodities traded to commodities
without interaction in use, or flowers. Combining the domain of resources with the
domain of valuations, we get a characterization of allocation organizations.ro Gxamples
are given in Table 3.
aF'irma are productive organizationa ueing eupra-local resourcea. We focue on allocation organ-
izationa.
9Knight (1992, p. 2) atates in line with North: "First, an inatitution ia a aei ojrvtca tha[ atrnctnre
socia! internctioaa ia particnfar waqa. Second, for a set of rules to be an institution, knowledge of
these rules mnst 6e ahaned 6q ihe memóero oj the relevant commrnitq or aocietq." The latter imphea
thxt inatilutiona are "common knowledge", which opena the way to the application of game theory.
We do not aasume that the rulea of the institution are common knowledge, but merely accepted by
the community in which it functions, i.e., there is a non-negligible group of users of the inatitution,
which is willing to eubmit reaources.
roWe remark that the explicit introduction ofthe need for allocative reeourcea contributes to nolving
the problem of fundamental indeterminacy in the domain of valuations.12
Prncessed valuation
AUocalion social interaction external interaction no interaction
1Y'ROIUY'('.ti
local government, political proccsses, vot.iug proce.dures
common interest regulatory
organizations institutions
supra-local social network or non-profit monetazy
institutions organizations, institutions
managed markets
global social pressure bazter markets
Table 3: Examples of allocation organizations
Any allocation mechanism implies a specification of the kind of valuations made by
owners and the corresponding information needed for its performance.t~ Since economic
ef6ciency criteria require attribution of costs and benefits, only allocation mechanisms
with non-interactive or external interactive valuations are considered by mainstream
neo-classical economists.
'1'he case of non-ínteractive valuation refers to the allocation of the economic
goods given in the last column of Table 1, such as the pure private and the pure public
goods, for which markets and voting procedures are natural examples, respectively. The
point we want to stress is that markets aze supported by important institutions, such
as monetary institutions and to a large extent also legal systems, that control the flows
of global private resources and require considerable allocative resourcea.'~ Markets
are in practice extremely imperfect and involve many "entrepreneurialn support to
11The deaign of allocation mechanisms for economies has a tradition that started with the socialiat
controveray in the thirtiea. It received new impulsea in the sixtiea from Hurwicz (1960) and Malinvaud
(1967), among othera, and in the eightiea trom agency theory, see Laffont and Tirole (1993). The
relation with institutions ia recently studied, aee Hurwicz (1989) and Tsuru (1989).
~~The imperfection of these institutiona ia illustrated by the experience of Mr. George Soroe, who
made a personal profit of a billion dollar in a weelc by apeculating againat the Btitiah pound, and
who now controls a private tund of more than 10 billion dollar. He emphasizea that "the succeea of
epeculation is a signal for politiciana that the eystem ie rotten, so it ahould be changed". Soutce:
interview in Die Zeit, 1993.13
funct.ion well.'~ Irnproving the flexibility of these. allocation organizations and implicitly
impruving Lhcir rules, rnay havc sirnilar wclfarc effexts as improving Lhe flexibility of
productive organizations.
'I'he second colurnn refers t.o institutions that purposely aim at external inter-
act.iun hrl.wr~,n acLurs, snch as rc,gulatory institutious, intcrest groups, aud non-pro(il,
organizat.ions. Ruks and statut~ for allocating rc~ourccw to Lhcsc categorics of or-
ganizations are not established at all. These rules rnay emerge gradually or may be
designed and imposed, e.g., markets for pollution rights. It may be a good idea to
stimulate a new kind of competition, not only among competitive production organi-
zations, but also between contestable allocation organizations.14 Although recent waves
of deregulation may have temporarily improved economic efGciency, it follows from the
characterization that certain valuations just cannot be allocated by `free' markets.
The main reason for privatization of public activities is that these productive
activities fit well in a market organization and involve maínly non-interactive valu-
ations. Activities with social interaction are usually effectively and swiftly executed
by a government, due to the relatively strong - although local - allocative powers it
possesses. Other institutions, such as social networks and norms, work slower but more
enduring. When the government wants also to assume responsibility for external inter-
active or non-interactive products, it needs resources that surpass its local scale. This
problem may be caused, however, by the absence of suitable allocation organizations
in tune with the market. The relative decline of domestic power of most national gov-
ernments over important economic issues, caused by the internationalization of these
13That thia ia even the case in the relatively "pertect" marketa ie ahown by the evidence of the
essentiality of socalled margrnal trnders for the well functioning of the price mechaniam as obaerved
in the 1988 presidential atock market as deacribed in Forsythe et al. (1992). This case deacribea a
very well regulated computer atock market that nevertheleea had to be aupported by relatively well
informed traders, who function as Kirznerian entrepreneura to diminiah the traneaction coata related
to the uae of the market mechaniam. Only through their involvement the market price indeed re8ected
all available information as expected in a perfect market. For a formal normative model of thia concept
we refer to Gilles et al. (1994).
'~In this case the Kirznerian entrepreneure as mentioned previoualy, while diacueaing marginal
traders in the setting of a market mechaniam, are then aupported by innovative governora. This
relates the obaerved monetary inatitutione and legal syateme with marginal trading and entrepreneurial
activities in relation to economic organizatione.14
is,w~s a.kiu~, fur supra-lu~:rl nwuw~iiy, unly :rF;~;ravaLi~s Lh~~ situal.iun.
4 Interaction between resources and valuations
'I'he interaction betwccn economic commodities and an allocation organization can be
illustrated by comparing the definition oí a market commodity made by industrial
economists and by general equilibrium economists. According to Debreu (1959, p.
32), a cornmodity is a good or service completely specified physica,lly, temporally, and
spatially. Debreu assumes that mazkets exist for all commodities, and claims that
"by focusing attention on changes of certain determinants one obtains as a particular
case of the general theory of commodities, a theory of saving, investment, capital,
and interest.n Industrial economists, however, are not happy with this definition.
We t.hink that we are close to their view when we define a market commodity as a
set of economic goods that have attributes in common which are close substitutes
for the (future) owners, and that are supplied and demanded in such quantities that
it is commonly known where this market demand and supply is concentrated. This
definition allows commodities with different carriers to belong to the same market. For
example, energy may be extracted from wood, oil, gas, nuclear fission or fusion, wind, or
sunshine. This type of interaction between a valuation and an allocation organiza.tion
applies to commodities in general. The success of the provision of a commodity with
given attributes by means of a suitable allocation organization may give rise to other
commodities with the same attributes but with different carriers, produced by more
efficient and complex production processes.
The second interaction refers to the emergence of new valuations, caused by the
success of markcts to provide commodities with non-interactive valuations. As soon as
thesc commodities are sufficiently available, the other types of commodities, i.e., with
social or external interaction, are required to be produced economically. Since the
allocative resources for organizations providing theae commodities were not available,
and markets cannot procure these commodities, they are not provided until pressure
groups succeeded in reshaping the valuations of a society. Examples are social security
systems, health care, and environmental protection. Although the industrial regions in15
the nineteenth century were undoubtedly dirtier than today, no measures were taken
on a scalc as today.
Hammond (1987) has revealed another type of interaction, namely the con-
straints markets impose upon achieving a desirable allocation, i.e., the provision of a
regulatory commodity. The second welfare theorem states that any efficient alloca.tion
can be achieved, using perfectly competitive markets as instruments, provided that,
o.a., a suitable lump-sum redistribution of initial resources is obtained. In contin-
uurn economies with private information, such redistribution is generally not incentive
cornpatible. In addition, when unofficial exchanges cannot be prevented these `under-
ground' markets emerge as constraints on the provision oí desirable allocations. Ham-
mond has shown that, starting from a market economy, one avenue to procure goods
with interactive valuations, in particular redistributive taxation, ends ultimately in a
burnpy road.
Are there other ways to let the market price reflect the full cost of production,
not only for non-interactive inputs, but also for social and external costs? This problem
is of course also essential for fair competition and free trade. In our approach it can
be solved by the emergence of economic allocation organizations that are compatible
with Lhe markets and have a supra-local character. In the polar case of an economy in
transition from traditional cooperative institutions with common property resources to
self-governing associations, based on defined (property) rights and private resources,
a similar struggle for developing allocation organizations can be observed, according
to Bardhan (1993). A way to describe this evolution of institutions is suggested by
the sociologist Granovetter (see Swedberg (1990)) who observes that personal networks
gradually take on an institutional form.
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